



COMPETING THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

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ABSTRACT:

Indian foreign policy is ambiguous and lacks a clear-cut framework for the preferences and strategy of foreign policy. Many scholars note that there are different strands of thought on India's external relations but unlike other major powers India does not have a well-defined grand strategy of foreign policy. In this paper attempts have been made to create a taxonomy of theoretical framework explaining Indian foreign policy. It can be said that it is done to maintain the flexibility in the conduct of foreign policy.



KEYWORDS: Foreign Policy, Theoretical Framework, Great Powers, Indian Political Thought

INTRODUCTION

Three broad approaches have been used for understanding foreign policy in India. These approaches can be defined through the description of Nehruvian, neo-liberal and hyperrealist ideas (Bajpai 2002:251). On the basis of a different taxonomy four major schools have been categorised as theoretical framework to understand Indian foreign policy. It has divided the Indian foreign policy school mainly into four types: nationalist, great power realist, liberal globalists and leftists. Further, nationalist school has been divided in to three categories: standard nationalist's neo-nationalists and hyper-nationalists (Ollapally and Rajagopalan 2013). As some other scholars believe that Indian foreign policy ideas are knitted into two opinions. These ideas are based on idealist and realist thinking. These ideas have been carried from Kautilya and Ashoka. The former is believed to be a sign of Machiavellian thinking, the latter an icon of universal values (Kumar 2008).

Theoretical explanation for Indian foreign policy starts with the question whether the foreign policy of India is well shaped by domestic variables rather than by international ones (Mitra and Schottli 2007:21). Sumit Ganguly (2010) has described that Indian foreign policy has transformed from idealist to amalgamation of Idealist and realist paradigm. After the cold war, the nature of the foreign policy is embedded with realist thinking with only a rhetorical nod to its ideational past. Gitika Commuri (2010) tries to locate the identity discourse in Indian foreign policy and its security paradigm. There is huge space for analysing the making and practice of India's foreign policy. First, deeper historical backgrounds of strategic worldview would add to the literature on India. Second, the intersection of politicians, bureaucrats, and Indian foreign policy is an interesting space for forthcoming work. Third, there is the requirement of exhaustive studies of the foreign policy apparatus (Narang and Staniland 2012:91). Without dismissing considerations of structural imperatives, it is found that the

role of domestic ideology and institutions have a significant place in shaping the foreign policy of India. Ideas, institutional structure and international structure drive Indian foreign policy (Narang & Staniland 2012:77). The categorisation presented here is based on the ideal type taxonomy. It will be unconvincing to say that the proponents of different strands and ideas would give their consent to every feature of these categorization and compartmentalisation. This taxonomy is helpful only to know or draw the worldviews in the debate of foreign policy in India.

Nationalist Perspective:

The nationalist perspective has its roots in cold war foreign policy. It emphasised on national autonomy, sovereignty and pursued common cause with other countries with an overarching non-alignment footprints that guide the Indian foreign policy makers (Ollapally and Rajagopalan 2011:146). This autonomous action is foundational point in the making of Indian foreign policy to nationalists. Nationalist see India's foreign policy as being under constant pressure to submit the interest of the country to those of major powers of the world. Nationalists oppose any kind of alliance which is seen as subverting the national interest of the country. A key claim of nationalist perspective is to take position on democratic global governance. They want to associate democratization of world politics with multipolarity. The fundamental concern for nationalist is the principle of equity. The key point of equity can be seen in the form of right of states rather than obligation (Ollapally and Rajagopalan 2011:148,149). Nationalists see fundamental contradictions in long term foreign policy of United State and Indian foreign policy. United State wants to strengthen unipolar world and India trusts that there is a need of multipolar world (Sikri 2009: 184).

On the basis of nationalist line, there are three variants in nationalist thinking regarding foreign policy. First thinking comes under the school of standard nationalist. They aim for India to be developed country and pursue balanced growth. The roots of these ideas are based on the Nehruvianism. Bajpai (2005) has categorized "Nehruvianism" as a significant approach in the foreign policy of India. It tried to search an independent way in Indian foreign policy. Nehruvian ideas dominated thinking till the time of Indira Gandhi. Nehruvians have taken the use of force in a skeptical way. India should be able to defend its country but it should not show much power which frightens other states in international system. Nehruvians want to keep Pakistan aside from its external supports and reject any kind of intervention from the outside power (Bajpai 2002: 261). The core of Nehruvians is to change the attitude of Pakistan towards India. This can be accomplished only through communication and contact. The policy of negotiation and engagement can be held by both government.

Trade is also a mean towards this direction. People to people interconnections especially in culture, sports and intellectual exchanges can serve for the better relationship, for example between India and Pakistan (Bajpai 2002: 261). Fundamental to Nehruvianism is the argument that states and people can maintain the peace if they come to understand each other. In the international system, without the supranational authority it is not possible to settle disputes and rivalries. States must look themselves in a word in which violence is regrettable (Bajpai 2002:251). Matoo (1996) concludes that the two pillars of Nehru's grand strategy were Non-alignment and self-reliance (Narang and Staniland 2012:81, 82). The speeches, writings, and instructions to the bureaucracy and congress party emphasised on independent and autonomous foreign policy (Narang and Staniland 2012:82). In Indian foreign policy, Nehru was more concerned with certain principles. These principles were idealistic internationalism, self-reliance, non-alignment and socialism. These principles continued even after his death (Ogden 2014). Nehru's foreign policy is consisted of five key elements. The first one was opposition to colonialism. The second element was the concept of non-alignment. The third element can be seen in its efforts to prevent the internationalisation of the conflict in Indo-China. In addition to it, the fourth feature was disarmament. Peaceful co-existence is seen as fifth feature of Nehruvian foreign policy (Kalyanaraman 2014:153-154). Strongly influenced by socialist perspectives, his ideas were a combination of liberal internationalism and the idea of a strong state. His views shared some of the

leftist ideas including skeptical views of the United States on cultural as well as ideological grounds (Cohen 2001:38). J.L Nehru influenced the first generation of Indian strategists. They remain suspicious about the actions of sole superpower. The Nehruvians accommodated themselves according to the new reality of the world. The accomplishments of Inder Kumar Gujral represented an attempt of an accommodating relationship with India's neighbors (Cohen 2001:40). The dominant perspective after 1962 was militant Nehruvianism. It was characterized by then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. It was adopted to answer the unbalanced international system (Cohen 2001: 41). These were main ideas which laid the foundations or mental architecture of the many generation of the Indian elite (Mohan 2004:31). It was identified that dominance and dependence were major roots of war in international relations (Narang and Staniland 2012:83). For Bajpai, Nehruvian school of thought is based on the premises that the pursuit of national interest is crucial. But communication and contact, international laws, International institutions, military restraints can help in the transformation of most conflictual relationship (Shankar and Paul 2010: 51). Under the rule of Indira Gandhi, India continued to pursue the principle of autonomy and domestic self-reliance. Even after Nehru's death, non-alignment continued to be significant policy across the Indian political spectrum (Tharoor 1982:41). In her Indian foreign policy, Indira Gandhi stressed largely the concept of independence (Tharoor 1982:66). Rajiv Gandhi in his Indian foreign policy renewed foreign policy while renewing its focus on self-reliance continued by Indira Gandhi under her rule (Narang and Staniland 2012:86). Under the leadership of Vajpayee, India followed the path of same course which was adopted by Indira Gandhi based on the independent worldview of the country on the basis of its national interest. Janta government did the same as Indira without new orientation (Mohan 2004:35).

Jawaharlal Nehru and India took the Kashmir issue to the United Nations in 1948 as a result of the commitment and faith in international organisation. While Nehruvians now, no longer have a faith in the United Nation generally dealing with Pakistan. But they want to go with bilateral agreements for resolving the problems between countries. Shimla agreement and Lahore declaration are most important to them. According to them, India's Pakistan policy should be based on all these agreements and confidence building measures (Dixit 2001). It reflected a belief in the possibility of peaceful resolution of disputes. With China, India believed in peaceful co-existence as explained in Panchsheel. It was the manifestation of this ideational belief. For Nehruvians, war has been viewed as a choice that states can make. For Nehruvians, internal security is based on a secular and democratic ideas. The use of force can be seen as the last resort for internal security. According to Nehruvian view, China was finally accountable for the conflict of 1962. But its fierceness was temporary. China and India have historically never been adversaries in history (Bhattacharjee 1999). In 1988, Rajiv Gandhi became the first Prime Minister to pay the visit to China after 1962. India has changed its approach towards China. Thus in 1990s, India has engaged in a number of confidence building arrangements with China. With the help of the confidence building measures, Asian powers can come close to each other in order to stay clear from mutual conflicts and to keep the United State out from the regional intervention (Dutt 1999). For Nehruvians, Non-alignment is the only mean to deal with the great power. It refuse to make permanent alliance with any great power. It focuses on the judgment based in the light of India's national interest. Secondly it has emphasized on the third world coalition against great power dominance. Thirdly, it has the attitude to foster the international institution and law. Nehruvians hold that nuclear weapons cannot be abolished in the present time. They are necessary for the national security of the country (Gosh 1999:94). On non-proliferation regime, according to them non-proliferation regime is fundamentally unequal and hegemonic. It should be resisted on such basis (Dubey 27, 2002). Disarmament is desirable. But nuclear weapons in few hand are discriminatory and it can bring to the world instability and violence.

After evaluating its various features, it can be pointed out that under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru, the foreign policy worldview were more dominated by ideational forces. After the death of Nehru, still India had the inclination towards Nehruvian legacy of idealist elements in Indian

foreign policy. But at the same time, it started to think of security and of military capabilities to defend country's territorial integrity. After the cold war, Indian foreign policy was left with little choice for the worldview of ideational foreign policy. But in spite of that, key individuals within Indian foreign policy establishment continued to argue the role of ideational foreign policy orientation (Ganguly 2010:2). A survey of Indian writing in international relations showed the lack of serious realist tradition in Indian foreign policy of post-independence India (Bajpai and Mallavarvarapu 2006). Idealist stance in India is considered as a shelter of weakness. India at the time of independence was not a strong country in comparison to other country and was not able to project its power abroad. In this situation, non-alignment was the means to keep great powers out. India's realism has been constrained by military, social and political incapacity. Idealism is considered the feature of weakness. (Mehta 2009:211). Nehruvian foreign policy can be described realist on the basis of its independent foreign policy principle. But at the same time, it has violated the expectations of realist to the extent capabilities were not adequate to support it (Nayer and Paul 2003:115-58).

Neo-nationalist:

The second perspective starts after the end of cold war. It is related to neo-nationalist focusing more on domestic consolidation and south-south solidarity. It has its roots in soft Nehruvianism. It has also been supported by the standard nationalist that there is a need for the development of indigenous military technology because of the need for strategic autonomy and a reluctance to be dependent on foreign countries for military hardware. In the term of nuclear policy, standard nationalist and hyper nationalists have a different opinion. They argue that only small numbers of arms are necessary for deterrence. They are supportive of the global disarmament initiatives. But hyper-nationalists are dismissive of such initiatives. Standard nationalists are more allied with the external face of Nehruvianism putting more emphasis on external face of Nehruvianism particularly strategic autonomy and sovereignty and on the other hand neo-nationalist are more concerned with domestic policy (Ollapally and Rajagopalan 2013). Neo-nationalist privileges domestic economic needs over external ambitions. Their major concern is that globalisation would increase domestic disparities. It will lead to the loss of economic and political sovereignty. There is a strong belief to protect the interest of the weaker section of the society as well as certain business sectors.

Hyper-nationalist or Culturist Nationalist:

The third perspective comes under hyper-nationalist idea. This perspective claims that India has to achieve global power first and to maintain tight internal security. Their roots of ideas lie with Kautilya's realist ideas and Hindu nationalism. The main difference between standard nationalist and hyper-nationalist lies at the point where nationalist emphasizes the political objectives of military power rather than seeing military power an end in itself (Ollapally and Rajagopalan 2013). Hyper nationalists aim to attain more autonomous position in international politics. They seek far greater military capability for India. They are opposed to any kind of measures which check or limit the military capability of India. They are suspicious of international interactions because it might constrain the autonomous power of the nation. They claim that India has to rely on its power to make its own way. That is why they are opposed the nuclear deal between the US and India. They advocate for an increase in military capability and military spending which sets them apart from other perspectives in Indian foreign policy. They oppose both principle of no first use and minimum deterrence principle of force. They are opposed to any kind of treaty which does not ensure the same privileges which has been enjoyed by the most powerful actors in the global system. There is family resemblance of Hindu nationalist views to realist stream. But it goes only so far, because unlike theorist in the realist tradition, Sawarkar and Gowalkar take the view that national power heavily depends on the cultivation of an assertive and exclusionary nationalism. Actually it undermines the concept of national power (Sagar 2014:237). India desires social and cultural coherence. Revolutionary socialism is not the need of India.

Those persons who by tradition and merit lead the society are at the core of their inclination. Respecting traditional cultural norms is one of the important component in their ideas. Cultural nationalists have argued that it is Hindu society that contributes to the fundamental unity of India. Internal security is realised by endorsing the ideas of Hinduism in which minorities will be considered with respect but in which Hindus come first (Golwalker 1939:2-3). For example, Golwalkar emphasises that only self-reliance can make a truly strong nation (Narang and Staniland 2012:87).

Hindutva could be seen quite comfortable with a Westphalian international system of nation states. According to their view, states uphold and promote their civilization. It is the role of civilisation that shapes history and moves history. India can be seen as the defender of Hindu civilisation (Bajpai 2014:130). The threat for India has been seen in the form of three rival civilisation : the Christian west, the Muslim world and China (Golwalkar 1939:2-3). With the advent of globalisation, their attitude has changed little towards the international system. United State and the West has been viewed as the long term threat (Vijay 2009:205-207). In the imagination of Hindutava, China was considered a threat in 1960s after the Indo-China war. Like Pakistan, which uses the Indian Muslims as a fifth column, China is seen to work with various socialist sympathisers to advance its interest (Bajpai 2014:135). After the cold war, they have advocated universal norms in the form of non-proliferation and non-intervention. These kind of actions of west has created the suspicion and threat to culturist nationalist. More contemporary ideas of this version is inclined to take different views of India's external relations. For them Pakistan and China is tractable but United State is more dominate power and is not to be trusted. Pakistan and China are seen having influenced by the Indian civilization but the US is not (Bajpai 2014:143). BJP rose to power in the 1998-2004 period. The foundational ideas of Hindutva gave some basic thinking regarding the question of Indian foreign policy. In 2014 election, BJP's victory revived Hindutava thinking.

Great Power Realist or Pragmatist :

The emphasis of pragmatists are global interests rather than global justice or ethics. Pragmatists argue that foreign policy has far too long been obsessed by ideological positions which in no way have enlarged the interest of the state. They argue that global institutions should not come in the way of national interest. Even pragmatists tends to be skeptical of the UN in general, but they are not opposed to the idea of India in the UN Security Council. Pragmatists think that Indian foreign policy should be framed after assessing the overall cost and benefit. Pragmatists have not shared the doubt which nationalists have of many international treaties or agreements. This attitude is also for various arms control agreements and initiatives (Ollapally and Rajagopalan 2011:51). For great power realists, the foreign policy should be based on managing relations with great powers of the world. They argue for greater involvement and integration in international system. They align themselves with standard nationalist on the question of balanced growth in economy and military matters. In spite of its idealist foreign policy, India ended up in war with its neighbors. India must gain security through arms and quasi alliances.

The war with China in 1962 and the American and Chinese efforts to contain India through Pakistan and war with Pakistan in 1965 brought home the lessons of realism in the conduct of foreign policy (Subrahmanyam 1997:69). After that there was immediate emphasis on military expansion and modernisation. Great power realist claims that Indian foreign policy behaviour is obvious in its nuclear policy. The crisis of 1971 in Bangladesh and the clear support of USA and China to Pakistan convinced India that the general international environment dominated by the US and the Soviet Union was hostile to the development of India as an independent centre of power (Mansingh 1984:55). India signed a semi-military friendship treaty with USSR in 1971 and did not condemn Soviet interventions in Czechoslovakia or Afghanistan (Subrahmanyam 1997:69). The domestic constraints which were there in 1960s were relaxed by 1990s. India was more confident to address issues emerging from the international structure. This was best reflected and illustrated in nuclear test of 1998 (Gosh 1997: 235-

61). This perspective has become more prominent after the nuclear test in 1998. India exploded nuclear weapons to gain a deterrent capability as well as powerful status in the international structure (Shankar and Paul 2010:50). India is on the way to becoming great power.

Nationalists are skeptical about the issue of arms control policy at the international level whereas the pragmatist claims to work with the nuclear non-proliferation regime. On issue of the Iran, nationalist and leftist have made the same point of backing Iran's right to develop civilian nuclear technology. But nationalist views are not united regarding this view of foreign policy (Ollapally and Rajagopalan 2011:153). Pragmatists defend India's position against the Iranian nuclear program and voting against Iran at the International Atomic Energy Agency, indicating that Iran has not acted as per obligations and India has little reason for backing Iran. As per the pragmatist view, the third world and the NAM are less significance in Indian foreign policy. In spite of that nationalists carry on arguing that the solidarity of NAM and third world is beneficial for India (Ollapally and Rajagopalan 2011:154).

Hyper Realist:

The governing element for hyper realist is threat and counter threat. Conflicts cannot be changed to peace. This is the major reason for the accumulation of power. Much of the hyper-realist literature has been exemplified in the works of Karnard and Chelleney. It is indeed based on criticism of the failure of Indian foreign policy makers for ignoring the line of realist logic (Bajpai 2007:806-809). War has been seen as a natural propensity in international relations. Preparing for war is part of the statecraft. Getting too powerful or weak invites for a situation of war (Chellaney 1999). In the hyperrealist view, the international system can be located as lonely place in which states have no permanent friends. Anyone can be on the opposite side. Neighboring states are more likely to maintain a position on the opposite side. Communication and economics resources of power cannot work. The international politics is based on zero sum game. It is true that only balance of power can control relations and hence Nehruvians and Neoliberals could fool themselves that more aggressiveness is always wrong (Chellaney: 1999: 558,536). On internal security, they are willing to practice force against those who are creating disorder and damaging peace. Hard, pre-emptive and dissuasive actions can be useful and this kind of actions promote lawful behaviour (Gill 1994:28-29). The only language that Pakistan understands is language of power and violence. It becomes necessary for India to develop its military power (Chellaney 1999: 527-595). It is must for Indian military to make Pakistan pay a much higher cost for the conflict in Kashmir. Indian forces should be more hostile as they were in Punjab. Economically India could raise economic warfare to increase the cost of conflict. Beyond military preparedness, New Delhi must move to make the alliance of Asian countries. It will be necessary for containing China in South Asia. Hyperrealist argues that international system is in anarchy. In such anarchical system, the only way of retaining power is with the help of accumulation of power. They claim that Nehruvians can be considered as idealistic and neoliberal are presenting faulty thinking. The logic of the economics is very much limited. Hyperrealist believes that politics comes before economics (Chellaney 1999:529-531), in their thinking, nuclear programme is considered as non-negotiable. India can be seen as a great power and nuclear weapons are necessary to solidify the India's status and security. United State's intervention is bearable as long as it goes for the support of Indian goals but US is not welcome as a mediator on the regional and Kashmir issue. Hyperrealist like Nehruvians wish that India should decline to join the non-proliferation regime (Karnard 1998:112,115-120). Hyperrealists argue that nuclear disarmament is unachievable. It is not practical and observable record in the history that disarmament principle flourished at any time in history. On the nature of deterrence, Nehruvians and neo-liberals are moderate whereas hyperrealist are maximalists. India's over cautious 'safety first' attitude may have won respite from immediate tensions in its relationship with other countries particularly with China and US. But it has also pushed back from the realisation of its entirely legitimate power ambitions (Karnard 2014:233).

Liberal Globalist:

A just global world order is based on the theme of liberal global interdependence. In this opinion, a stable world order is created by the dynamics of interdependence through trade and other networks. In spite of the fact, that India has emerged as an emerging power, its central concerns will be described by questions of its identity, territory and economic well-being in interdependent world (Mehta 2009:225,232). India has to grasp the challenges and opportunities so that national interests may be promoted (Muni 1991:864). Neoliberals believe that India must gain economic power instead of only focusing on military power. Economic strength has been considered as the basis for military power. Economic power is the substitute to military power and can be more effective than military power (Mohan 2001). Free market policies are the core of economic strength. Through trade and economic interactions this strength can be achieved. At the core of neoliberal ideas there is the logic of market reforms and logic of comparative advantage. They pay less attention on military power, ideology and moralism in foreign policy. They see diplomacy and trade playing a major role in present globalised world. Ties in trade have been perceived as ameliorating conflict between India and its neighbors. They assume that India's prominence at the world stage is because of its economic power. Their main focus is on the role of economy but they do not dismiss the military power completely. India's global influence is seen flowing from its success in its economy. Multilateralism has been seen as an important tool for the proper engagement of India with economic powers of world. The major assumption of the liberal globalists is that India is on the pace to acquire a developed country status. India has served its interests primarily in its relationship with the US. Indian foreign policy makers have to realise that interdependence can create new possibilities of power. The integration of the Indian economy is helpful to realize the virtue of interdependence (Mehta 2009:225-226). The power politics gives no motive for other countries to walk along with the state obsessed with power (Mehta 2009:218). Interdependence demands more pragmatic international policies. The worries of state include not only war but also involve the role of trade, investment and technology (Baru 1998:90, 91). India must have adequate forces to defend interest. But at the same time it should have the capability of taking initiatives in the global economy which eventually leads to make society more protected. The strength of India lies in greater integration in the economy of the world. Economic growth and modernisation has become the source of strength for India (Mohan 2001).

Instead of strategic autonomy and self-reliance, Manmohan Singh's wing of congress is characterised to pursue the policy based on the neoliberal ideas (Bajpai 2002:245-304). This congress wing wants to accelerate economic growth by generating global economic competitiveness and alleviating the effect of poverty. It focuses on the integration of Indian economy with world economy (Narang and Staniland 2012:88). According to Neoliberals, there should be more pacific and accommodative views in relation to Pakistan. New Delhi has to use the tactic constructed on the assurance of mutual gains, predominantly economic gains (Datter 2001). Neo-liberals have argued that the leaders of Pakistan cannot be considered above the logic of cost and benefit analysis. Whatever identity the Pakistan is carrying, at the last moment it has to think in term of benefits and disadvantages of alternative course of action. Economic well-being becomes supreme interest for any society. For Pakistan, in order to give better life to its people, it is must to deal with India in economical term (Mohan 2001). The question of security and rivalry will disappear as the question of economics come to centre stage. The possibility for India to become a great power is more or less inevitable. India can be a great power by increasing its economic growth. India has to work in the areas of trade, technology transfers and investment (Gonsalves 2001). For neoliberal, it is anachronistic to resist the great powers. There is only one great power and to resist this power is impractical. They aspire that India should be a nuclear weapon power. But they also wish India to join the non-proliferation order as the way of putting check on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. India's strategic reorientation towards neoliberalism is evolving after the result of economic liberalisation. The shift in strategy has benefitted India in many ways. India has been able to accelerate its economic growth. Its deepening

engagement with major powers and its integration within the global economy has benefited India (Sisodia 2014:195).

Neoliberals also have sharp differences with Nehruvians. They think that the mixed economy in India became only regulative. Licence and permit raj produced corruption and stagnation in economy. On the other hand, the real essence of the reservation policy has been distorted. It has been extended without keeping in mind the level from where it can be destructive. The sustained limits of social justice have been crossed for a quota system (Bajpai 2002:258). Neoliberals argue that it is futile to keep great powers out. Great power could be advantageous to India (Gupta: 2000). Whereas Nehruvians want to modify the thinking on Pakistan, neoliberals are more pragmatic and assert on economic development which will ultimately cause accommodation. Economic development in Pakistan will do more to change elite and popular attitudes than anything India can achieve by way of political, social and cultural engagement.

Leftists:

They accept the existence and importance of nationalism. But at the centre of their politics is the existence of class struggle. In their view, national state and the international system is superstructure. The relations between states are determined by economic base and class relations. In the long run, communism is achieved step by step. For Marxists, the primary threat is seen in the form of imperialism based in the capital world. This world is seen to be based on the class structure where the privileges are given to bourgeoisie class. Major capitalist states are at the top of an imperial system. The foremost leading actor is the US. With the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war the United State has become the biggest threat in the era of globalisation. Indian ruling class and bourgeoisie tend to be a class who serve the interest of global capitalism (Bajpai 2014:132). In the case of relationship with Pakistan, Marxists are closer to Nehruvian ideas emphasising military preparedness and bilateral negotiations and agreement leading to a settlement of disputes. They see the rise of China as an opportunity for India in trade relationships. They argue that India can learn from China in terms of state's role in human development, economic growth and state regulated economy (Bajpai 2014:140). Marxists argue that instead of looking at the role of Chinese state, India should empower the state to regulate or control financial flow in economy (Karat 293-99).

The leftists take a very strong ideological stand on Indian foreign policy, opposing closer ties with the United States. For the left, civilian nuclear deal between India and the US was the most problematic issue. It was driven by a fundamental difference on where India's interests lie. It was driven by ideologically motivated distrust towards the United State. According to them, the orientation of foreign policy has shifted towards United State. Clearly India has surrendered the independent way of making foreign policy as indicated in strategic alliance with the United States of America. India has curtailed the scope of its national interest by acting against Iran. India has cut down oil imports from Iran. India did not denounce the western intervention to destabilise the governments of different countries. The US intervention in Kuwait, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria are few examples. There are strong ties between India and United State on security issues. India has downgraded the cause of Palestinians. India-Japan-US trilateral relationship has been sponsored to curtail China. Independent and non-alignment foreign policy promoting multipolarity is the essential for Indian foreign policy. There is a need for strengthening BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) through collaboration. At the same it is essential to strengthen the multilateral forum like United Nation for dealing disputes between countries. There is a need for democratization of the structure of United Nation. At the global level it is must to oppose any kind of intervention by the US and NATO. It has already done this in Libya, Syria and Ukraine. Marxist perception on Indian foreign policy is a continuous dialogue with Pakistan for resolving all kind of issues between these two countries. They endorse people to people contacts between India and Pakistan. Revision of Indo-US nuclear deal is essential for becoming self-reliance in civilian nuclear energy. On national security, there

should be a balanced relationship between central and state government in tackling the Maoist activities. But at the same time, exact measures should be taken to tackle the socio-economic glitches faced by the tribal people in the Maoist affected zones. The Maoist problem cannot be regarded as just a security issue (Manifesto of Communist Party of India (Marxist) 2014).

Gandhian:

They argue that human relationship can be ordered with the help of individual values and behaviour. Family, village or urban localities are embedded in nation state. States are part of regions and continents and in the end, in the international system. Individuals should follow the rules and norms of families, communities, nation state and international system until or unless they come into conflict with individual conscience. The individual conscience is guided by two important principles-Truth and non-violence. Finally individuals should be driven by the voice of conscience, not the norms and rules of the collective (Bajpai 2014:131-132). For Gandhians, threat in world order stems from industrial civilization which is the one phenomena of modernity. According to Gandhian view, that Indian upper and lower class has been drifting away from their culture by adopting the ways of thought of the west (Bajpai 2014:137).The US is not a military threat to India but is a threat in propagation of its way of life. It is unsustainable and will harm Indians. Its culture will lead India and other countries on the path of moral and material collapse. Gandhians argues that through resistance and persuasion one can turn their adversary to accept ones point of view. Thus, Americans can be rid of industrial civilisation if they come closer to India and the developing countries (Bajpai 2014:146). Gandhi's rejection of the western worldview had significant implication for his overall understanding of the modern state system. To him, modernity is built on the misplaced premises. He drew his illustration form modern medicine. It cured the symptoms but left the disease untouched. Its main focus is on specialisation missing overall sense of the patient (Mallavarapu 2014:233).

In brief, there are different perspectives outlining the foreign policy of India. The base for each groups is too narrow, especially for the tiny group of hyper-nationalist. Liberal globalist and standard nationalist are focusing more on the market driven ideology (Ollapally and Rajagopalan 2013). Generally, India possesses a very much ambiguous dimension of its foreign policy. The reason can be perceived in the form of difference in the process of nation building in India and in European countries. The principle of non-violence of Gandhi and the principle of peaceful-coexistence of Nehru are still referred for the justification of India's domestic and foreign policy. It is claimed that Indian foreign policy is less unclear in deed than is in terms of principles or doctrines (Mitra and Scholtli: 33, 34). The realists differ from Nehruvians in a way that they believe that the world has changed fundamentally. Pragmatism and idealism exist side by side in the strategic thought in Indian foreign policy. Jawaharlal Nehru manifested these traits simultaneously. For this reason he has been considered one of the important figures in Indian history. Legacy of complexity combines the diverse strands in a truly Indian outlook which can be considered as the true approach to the world (Cohen 2001:533:54).

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